

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR  
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA  
RICHMOND DIVISION

COREY A. HOWELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. M. MOORE, individually and in his official capacity  
as a police officer,

Serve: 10001 Iron Bridge Road  
Chesterfield, VA 23832

POLICE OFFICERS JOHN DOES nos. 1–5, individually  
and in their capacity as police officers,

COL. THIERRY G. DUPUIS, individually and in his  
official capacity as Chief of Police of the Chesterfield  
County Police Department,

Serve: 10001 Iron Bridge Road  
Chesterfield, VA 23832

AND

CHESTERFIELD COUNTY, VIRGINIA,

Serve: Jeffrey L. Mincks, County Attorney  
Lane B. Ramsey Administration Building  
5th Floor, Room 503  
9901 Lori Road  
Chesterfield, VA 23832

Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 3:16 CV 649

**JURY TRIAL  
DEMANDED**

**COMPLAINT**

COMES NOW Plaintiff Corey A. Howell, by Counsel, and moves this Court for judgment against Defendants A. M. Moore, individually and in his official capacity as a police officer; Police Officers John Does nos. 1–5, individually and in their official capacities as police officers; Col.

Thierry G. Dupois, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police of Chesterfield County Police Department; and Chesterfield County, Virginia, jointly and severally, in the manner and for the reasons set forth below:

PARTIES

1. Corey A. Howell (“Mr. Howell”) is a former long-time resident of the Commonwealth of Virginia who now resides in the District of Columbia and is over the age of eighteen (18).

2. Upon information and belief, Defendants A. M. Moore and Police Officer John Does nos. 1–5 are residents of the Commonwealth of Virginia and are over the age of eighteen. At all times material hereto, said Defendants were police officers and/or employees in the Chesterfield County Police Department. All are being sued in both their individual capacities and their official capacities as police officers and/or employees of the Chesterfield County Police Department. Police Officer John Does nos. 1–5 true names are currently unknown to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff intends to amend this Complaint to name them as defendants as soon as their identities are ascertained.

3. Upon information and belief, Col. Thierry G. Dupois is the Chief of Police of the Chesterfield County Police Department, which maintains its principal office at 10001 Iron Bridge Road, Chesterfield, Virginia 23832. Col. Dupois is being sued in both his individual capacity and his official capacity as the Chief of Police of the Chesterfield County Police Department.

4. Upon information and belief, Chesterfield County, Virginia, is a United States county located near the state capital of Richmond. Upon information and belief, it maintains its principal address at 9901 Lori Road, Chesterfield, Virginia 23832. The County is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Upon information and belief, the Chesterfield County Police

Department was established as part of the County, and not as a separate legal entity, thereby making any of its actions or omissions attributable to the County.

5. Defendants Col. Thierry G. Dupois and Chesterfield County, Virginia, are liable to Plaintiff under *Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978) for the reasons set forth below and/or under the common law doctrine of *respondeat superior*, as the conduct of the individual defendants occurred while they were on duty and in uniform, in and during the course and scope of their duties and functions as Chesterfield County police officers and/or employees, and while they were acting as agents or employees of Chesterfield County Police Department and/or Chesterfield County, Virginia.

6. Before maintaining this action, in accordance with Va. Code § 15.2-1248, Plaintiff has presented his claim to the governing body of Chesterfield County, Virginia, by delivering via email and overnight delivery a copy of two Notice Letters—one for Chesterfield County, Virginia, and the other for Col. Thierry G. Dupois—to the County’s Board of Supervisors at P.O. Box 40, Chesterfield, VA 23832.

#### STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

7. This Court has original diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 states that federal district courts have original jurisdiction over lawsuits where there is (i) complete diversity between the parties and (ii) the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds \$75,000.00. In this case, with respect to (i), the citizenship of Plaintiff is completely diverse from the citizenship of Defendants. Plaintiff maintains his residence in the District of Columbia, while Defendants maintain their principal addresses in the Commonwealth of Virginia. With respect to (ii), the amount in controversy well

exceeds the requisite \$75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs, as Plaintiff has sued Defendants for \$1,000,000.

8. The Court also has original jurisdiction of Plaintiff's lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, as this action seeks redress for the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional and civil rights. Plaintiff is also able to invoke this Court's supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over any and all state law claims, as they are part of the same case or controversy as his federal claims.

9. Plaintiff thus hereby affirmatively pleads this Court's original diversity jurisdiction over this lawsuit.

#### VENUE

10. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendants reside, and the events giving rise to the claims herein occurred, in Chesterfield County, Virginia, which is within the Richmond Division for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

#### STATEMENT OF FACTS

11. By way of background, Plaintiff is an African-American male who was twenty-one (21) years old during the events that gave rise to this cause of action. Before moving to the District of Columbia to attend American University, where he studies public health, political science, and education, he was raised in Goochland County, Virginia.

12. Plaintiff is an exemplary individual; as just one example, Plaintiff was appointed by U.S. Senator Tim Kaine to the Virginia Foundation for Healthy Youth's Board of Trustees as one of its two Youth Members.

13. At around 11:30 p.m. on August 3, 2014, Plaintiff was traveling southbound on Jefferson Davis Highway in his 2012 Ford Focus. Feeling drowsy due to fatigue and/or having recently taken a Benadryl for his allergies, Plaintiff pulled off of Jefferson Davis Highway and into the parking lot for the Advance Auto Parts store located at 11620 Jefferson Davis Highway, Chester, Virginia 23831.

14. In the parking lot, Plaintiff placed his vehicle in park and began to rest. Plaintiff's car was legally parked and he was not engaged in any unlawful activity or planning to engage in any unlawful activity, nor to his knowledge was any unlawful activity occurring in or near his presence.

15. Shortly after Plaintiff began to rest, a Chesterfield County Police Department vehicle pulled up behind Plaintiff's car, blocking Plaintiff in, and activated its emergency lights.

16. A Chesterfield County police officer, who upon information and belief was A. M. Moore ("Officer Moore"), then approached the front driver side door of Plaintiff's car and began to interrogate Plaintiff.

17. The officer asked Plaintiff for his ID, which Plaintiff provided. Upon information and belief, the officer verified Plaintiff's identity and discovered that he had no outstanding arrest warrants or any criminal record. Officer Moore then asked if he could search Plaintiff's car, to which Plaintiff did not object since he had nothing to hide.

18. Officer Moore then began searching Plaintiff's car. During or shortly after this time, five (5) additional Chesterfield County police officers arrived at the scene. All six officers, including Officer Moore, were Caucasian. This made Plaintiff feel distressed and as if he were being targeted because of his race.

19. The first officer conducted a search and indicated nothing was discovered. Not finding this sufficient, several more officers decided to search the vehicle. None of the officers indicated or claimed to have discovered anything potentially illegal. Nonetheless, they demanded that Plaintiff take a seat on the ground and they proceeded to interrogate him.

20. Some time after the search of Plaintiff's car by the multiple officers, an abrasive and very physically imposing officer stated that they had discovered a powdery white substance in Plaintiff's car. The officer asserted that the powdery substance was an illegal drug.

21. Plaintiff, knowing that no such substance could have been found in his vehicle, advised the officer(s) that he must be mistaken. The officer(s) then told Plaintiff something to the effect that, "You can do this the easy way and tell us whether it's meth or coke, or we can just run it through the lab." Plaintiff again advised them that they must be mistaken.

22. Shortly thereafter, the officers began to search Plaintiff's vehicle for a third time. Plaintiff did not consent to this third search, nor was he told he had the right to refuse the search or that he was free to leave. Plaintiff's will was "overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired" as the officers conducted this third search.

23. Following the third search, the officers claimed to discover two (2) prescription pills—one being Dilaudid and the other Percocet.

24. Plaintiff advised the officers that he had been prescribed both types of pills for his Crohn's Disease, which he told them he had been diagnosed with in 2007. He pleaded with the officers to let him contact his pharmacy to confirm same. He provided the officers with the name and location of his CVS pharmacy, which was a 24-hour pharmacy.

25. The officers refused to consider the "readily available exculpatory evidence," and instead placed Plaintiff under arrest, **charged him with two (2) felony counts of possession of a**

**controlled substance**, made him lay face down on the pavement, handcuffed his hands behind his back, placed him in the backseat of a police vehicle, and took him to jail. Plaintiff had been detained for about an hour from when the initial stop was made to when he was arrested.

26. While at jail, Plaintiff went before a magistrate, who advised him he would be released on his own recognizance. After remaining in jail for over five (5) hours, he was released.

27. On August 4, 2014, Plaintiff was charged with two Class 5 felony charges for possession of a controlled substance. The cases were styled *Commonwealth v. Corey A. Howell*, Case Nos. GC14007374-75.

28. Plaintiff's preliminary hearings were initially scheduled for October 2014, but were continued until January 7, 2015. On that date, the Commonwealth attorney assigned to Plaintiff's matters *nolle prossed* both cases because the Commonwealth recognized the allegations were baseless.

#### COUNT I

(42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Unlawful Search, Seizure, and Arrest)

29. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1–28 are incorporated into Count I as if fully set forth herein.

30. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is incorporated to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Persons violating the Fourth Amendment under the color of state law are liable at law and in equity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

31. The Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by (i) exceeding the scope of Plaintiff's consent to search his vehicle; (ii) detaining Plaintiff for longer than necessary to verify his reason for taking a nap in a public parking lot; (iii) using excessive force in interrogating Plaintiff for close to an hour, surrounding Plaintiff with six officers (all of whom

were Caucasian), creating false allegations of drug possession, forcing Plaintiff to lie face-down on the asphalt, handcuffing his hands behind his back and taking him off to jail; and (iv) arresting Plaintiff without probable cause, or even reason to believe there was probable cause, especially in light of the fact that Plaintiff made the Defendants aware of readily available exculpatory evidence.

32. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful actions in this regard, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer pain, mental anguish, embarrassment and humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life; and has sustained and will continue to sustain lost wages and/or diminished earnings capacity; among other things.

33. Plaintiff also requests an award of punitive damages against the individual Defendants based on Defendants' misconduct or actual malice, or such recklessness or negligence so as to evidence a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights.

COUNT II  
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Conspiracy)

34. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1–33 are hereby incorporated into Count II as if fully set forth herein.

35. Defendants conspired or acted jointly or in concert to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional right to unreasonable searches and seizures.

36. Defendants took overt actions in furtherance of the conspiracy by conducting an unauthorized and unlawful search of Plaintiff's car; planting, and/or falsely claiming that they found, a white powdery substance in his vehicle; and disregarding Plaintiff's representation that the prescription drugs that were allegedly found in his car were lawfully his and obtained pursuant to a valid prescription(s).

37. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful actions in this regard, Plaintiff was deprived of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures and



has suffered and will continue to suffer pain, mental anguish, embarrassment and humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life; and has sustained and will continue to sustain lost wages and/or diminished earnings capacity; among other things.

38. Plaintiff also requests an award of punitive damages against the individual Defendants based on Defendants' misconduct or actual malice, or such recklessness or negligence so as to evidence a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights.

COUNT III  
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Malicious Prosecution)

39. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1–38 are incorporated into Count III as if fully set forth herein.

40. The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures incorporates a right to be free from malicious prosecution.

41. Defendants maliciously caused a seizure of Plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and the ensuing criminal proceedings terminated in Plaintiff's favor.

42. A reasonable person in Defendants' position would have known that the facts and circumstances were insufficient to justify a reasonable belief that Plaintiff had committed any offense, let alone two felony offenses.

43. At all times material hereto, Defendants were acting under the color of state law.

44. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful actions in this regard, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer pain, mental anguish, embarrassment and humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life; and has sustained and will continue to sustain lost wages and/or diminished earnings capacity; among other things.

45. Plaintiff also requests an award of punitive damages against the individual Defendants based on Defendants' misconduct or actual malice, or such recklessness or negligence so as to evidence a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights.

COUNT IV  
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 – *Monell* Claim)

46. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1–44 are hereby incorporated into Count IV as if fully set forth herein.

47. At all times material hereto, Defendant Chesterfield County, Virginia, acting by and through Chesterfield County Police Department and/or Defendant Col. Thierry G. Dupois, developed, implemented, enforce, encouraged, and/or sanctioned policies, practices, and/or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional rights, including to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, racial discrimination and profiling, and/or arrest quotas, among possibly other things.

48. Defendants Chesterfield County, Virginia, and Col. Thierry G. Dupois further failed to adequately supervise and train their officers, including the individual defendants, thereby failing to adequately discourage further constitutional violations on their parts, and to properly and adequately monitor and discipline its officers, including the individual defendants.

49. More specifically, Defendants Chesterfield County, Virginia and Col. Thierry G. Dupois developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and/or sanctioned the policies, practices, and/or customs of (i) unlawfully profiling and/or arresting, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, those who fit the criminal stereotype of African-American males like Plaintiff and (ii) mandating at least two (2) to three (3) traffic stops and one (1) arrest every shift, which, if not met by a given police officer, would result in disciplinary action.

50. Defendants Chesterfield County, Virginia's and Col. Thierry G. Dupois' unlawful actions were done willfully, knowingly, and with specific intent to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

51. As a direct and proximate result of the acts stated herein by said Defendants, Plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated, which has caused him to suffer pain, mental anguish, embarrassment and humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life, and has caused and will continue to cause him to suffer lost wages and/or diminished earnings capacity, among other things.

52. Plaintiff also requests an award of punitive damages based on Defendant Dupois's personal misconduct or actual malice, or such recklessness or negligence so as to evidence a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights.

COUNT V  
(Common Law Malicious Prosecution)

53. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1–52 are incorporated into this Count V as if fully set forth herein.

54. The prosecution of Plaintiff for two felony counts of possession of a controlled substance was maliciously instituted by, or with the cooperation of, Defendants. Defendants brought the criminal charges against Plaintiff that led to Plaintiff's prosecution and/or requested initiation of the proceedings.

55. Said prosecution was instituted against Plaintiff without probable cause, especially since Defendants refused to seek readily available exculpatory evidence. Defendants did not have knowledge of facts and circumstances to form the reasonable belief that Plaintiff was guilty of the crime of which he was ostensibly suspected.

56. Defendants acted with actual malice in that their controlling motive was something other than a good faith desire to further the ends of justice, enforce obedience to criminal laws, suppress crime, or see that the guilty are punished. Rather, upon information and belief, Defendants were motivated by stereotyping, bias, meeting unconstitutional arrest quotas, and/or prejudice against Plaintiff on account of his race or ethnicity or some other improper motive.

57. Defendants' criminal charges against Plaintiff were terminated in a manner not unfavorable to him. More specifically, the Commonwealth *nolle prossed* both charges and has no intent to prosecute Plaintiff again. In fact, on June 24, 2016, with the Commonwealth Attorney's office's consent, the Circuit Court for the County of Chesterfield ordered that Plaintiff's charges be expunged.

58. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' malicious prosecution against Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer pain, mental anguish, embarrassment and humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life; and has sustained and will continue to sustain lost wages and/or diminished earnings capacity; among other things.

59. Plaintiff also requests an award of punitive damages against the individual Defendants based on Defendants' misconduct or actual malice, or such recklessness or negligence so as to evidence a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Corey A. Howell, by Counsel, respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter judgment in his favor, and against Defendants A. M. Moore, individually and in his official capacity as a police officer; Police Officers John Does nos. 1–5, individually and in their official capacity as police officers; Col. Thierry G. Dupois, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police of Chesterfield County Police Department; and Chesterfield County, Virginia, jointly and severally, in the following manner:

- (a) Compensatory damages in an amount of not less than \$1,000,000 against Defendants for the above-listed federal and state claims;
- (b) Punitive damages in an amount of not less than \$350,000 against all Defendants, excluding the County, in their personal capacity for their misconduct and actual malice;
- (c) Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs incurred during and in connection with this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and/or all other applicable state or federal law;
- (d) Pre- and post-judgment interest on the foregoing amounts; and
- (e) Any and all other relief that this Court deems just and proper.

COREY A. HOWELL

By:   
Of Counsel


Timothy P. Bosson, VSB# 72746  
Robert G. Rose, VSB# 81240  
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AND

Monique Miles, Esq., VSB# 78828  
Old Towne Associates, PC  
216 S. Patrick St.  
Alexandria, VA 22314  
Ph: (703) 519-6810  
mmiles@oldtowneassociates.com  
*Counsel for Plaintiff*

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff requests a trial by jury on all claims made herein.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Timothy P. Bosson

JS 44 (Rev. 07/16)

**CIVIL COVER SHEET**

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

**I. (a) PLAINTIFFS**  
**COREY A. HOWELL****DEFENDANTS****A. M. MOORE; POLICE OFFICERS JOHN DOES 1-5; COL. THIERRY G. DUPOIS; and CHESTERFIELD COUNTY, VIRGINIA**(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Washington, DC  
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)County of Residence of First Listed Defendant Chesterfield  
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)  
**Timothy P. Bosson, Robert G. Rose, Christian Legal Aid of the District of Columbia, PO Box 70555, Washington, DC 20024, (202) 710-0592**

Attorneys (If Known)

**II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION** (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- ☐ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff
- ☒ 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)
- ☐ 2 U.S. Government Defendant
- ☐ 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

**III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES** (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)

- |   |                                       |                                       |   |                            |                            |
|---|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|
|   | PTF                                   | DEF                                   |   | PTF                        | DEF                        |
| Citizen of This State                   | <input type="checkbox"/> 1            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1 | Incorporated or Principal Place of Business in This State     | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 |
| Citizen of Another State                | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> 2            | Incorporated and Principal Place of Business in Another State | <input type="checkbox"/> 5 | <input type="checkbox"/> 5 |
| Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country | <input type="checkbox"/> 3            | <input type="checkbox"/> 3            | Foreign Nation  | <input type="checkbox"/> 6 | <input type="checkbox"/> 6 |

**IV. NATURE OF SUIT** (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

<b>CONTRACT</b>	<b>TORTS</b>	<b>FORFEITURE/PENALTY</b>	<b>BANKRUPTCY</b>	<b>OTHER STATUTES</b>	
<input type="checkbox"/> 110 Insurance <input type="checkbox"/> 120 Marine <input type="checkbox"/> 130 Miller Act <input type="checkbox"/> 140 Negotiable Instrument <input type="checkbox"/> 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment <input type="checkbox"/> 151 Medicare Act <input type="checkbox"/> 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excludes Veterans) <input type="checkbox"/> 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits <input type="checkbox"/> 160 Stockholders' Suits <input type="checkbox"/> 190 Other Contract <input type="checkbox"/> 195 Contract Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 196 Franchise	<b>PERSONAL INJURY</b> <input type="checkbox"/> 310 Airplane <input type="checkbox"/> 315 Airplane Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 320 Assault, Libel & Slander <input type="checkbox"/> 330 Federal Employers' Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 340 Marine <input type="checkbox"/> 345 Marine Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 350 Motor Vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 360 Other Personal Injury <input type="checkbox"/> 362 Personal Injury - Medical Malpractice	<b>PERSONAL INJURY</b> <input type="checkbox"/> 365 Personal Injury - Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 367 Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability <b>PERSONAL PROPERTY</b> <input type="checkbox"/> 370 Other Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> 371 Truth in Lending <input type="checkbox"/> 380 Other Personal Property Damage <input type="checkbox"/> 385 Property Damage Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 <input type="checkbox"/> 690 Other <b>LABOR</b> <input type="checkbox"/> 710 Fair Labor Standards Act <input type="checkbox"/> 720 Labor/Management Relations <input type="checkbox"/> 740 Railway Labor Act <input type="checkbox"/> 751 Family and Medical Leave Act <input type="checkbox"/> 790 Other Labor Litigation <input type="checkbox"/> 791 Employee Retirement Income Security Act <b>IMMIGRATION</b> <input type="checkbox"/> 462 Naturalization Application <input type="checkbox"/> 465 Other Immigration Actions	<input type="checkbox"/> 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 <input type="checkbox"/> 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 <b>PROPERTY RIGHTS</b> <input type="checkbox"/> 820 Copyrights <input type="checkbox"/> 830 Patent <input type="checkbox"/> 840 Trademark <b>SOCIAL SECURITY</b> <input type="checkbox"/> 861 HIA (1395ff) <input type="checkbox"/> 862 Black Lung (923) <input type="checkbox"/> 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) <input type="checkbox"/> 864 SSID Title XVI <input type="checkbox"/> 865 RSI (405(g)) <b>FEDERAL TAX SUITS</b> <input type="checkbox"/> 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) <input type="checkbox"/> 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609	<input type="checkbox"/> 375 False Claims Act <input type="checkbox"/> 376 Qui Tam (31 USC 3729(a)) <input type="checkbox"/> 400 State Reapportionment <input type="checkbox"/> 410 Antitrust <input type="checkbox"/> 430 Banks and Banking <input type="checkbox"/> 450 Commerce <input type="checkbox"/> 460 Deportation <input type="checkbox"/> 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations <input type="checkbox"/> 480 Consumer Credit <input type="checkbox"/> 490 Cable/Sat TV <input type="checkbox"/> 850 Securities/Commodities/Exchange <input type="checkbox"/> 890 Other Statutory Actions <input type="checkbox"/> 891 Agricultural Acts <input type="checkbox"/> 893 Environmental Matters <input type="checkbox"/> 895 Freedom of Information Act <input type="checkbox"/> 896 Arbitration <input type="checkbox"/> 899 Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision <input type="checkbox"/> 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes
<b>REAL PROPERTY</b>	<b>CIVIL RIGHTS</b>	<b>PRISONER PETITIONS</b>			
<input type="checkbox"/> 210 Land Condemnation <input type="checkbox"/> 220 Foreclosure <input type="checkbox"/> 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment <input type="checkbox"/> 240 Torts to Land <input type="checkbox"/> 245 Tort Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 290 All Other Real Property	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 440 Other Civil Rights <input type="checkbox"/> 441 Voting <input type="checkbox"/> 442 Employment <input type="checkbox"/> 443 Housing/Accommodations <input type="checkbox"/> 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - Employment <input type="checkbox"/> 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - Other <input type="checkbox"/> 448 Education	<b>Habeas Corpus:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> 463 Alien Detainee <input type="checkbox"/> 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence <input type="checkbox"/> 530 General <input type="checkbox"/> 535 Death Penalty <b>Other:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> 540 Mandamus & Other <input type="checkbox"/> 550 Civil Rights <input type="checkbox"/> 555 Prison Condition <input type="checkbox"/> 560 Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement			

**V. ORIGIN** (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- ☒ 1 Original Proceeding
- ☐ 2 Removed from State Court
- ☐ 3 Remanded from Appellate Court
- ☐ 4 Reinstated or Reopened
- ☐ 5 Transferred from Another District (specify)
- ☐ 6 Multidistrict Litigation - Transfer
- ☐ 8 Multidistrict Litigation - Direct File

**VI. CAUSE OF ACTION**Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):  
**42 U.S.C. 1983**Brief description of cause:  
**Violation of Fourth Amendment rights under color of state law****VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:**☐ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.DEMAND \$  
**1,350,000.00**CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:  
JURY DEMAND: ☒ Yes ☐ No**VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY**

(See instructions):

JUDGE

DOCKET NUMBER

DATE

**8/1/16**

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # \_\_\_\_\_ AMOUNT \_\_\_\_\_ APPLYING IFP \_\_\_\_\_ JUDGE \_\_\_\_\_ MAG. JUDGE \_\_\_\_\_

Court Name: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
Division: 3  
Receipt Number: 34683033950  
Cashier ID: Ibreenen  
Transaction Date: 08/02/2016  
Payer Name: CHRISTIAN LEGAL AID OF DC

CIVIL FILING FEE  
For: CHRISTIAN LEGAL AID OF DC  
Amount: \$400.00

CHECK  
Check/Money Order Num: 1148  
Amt Tendered: \$400.00

Total Due: \$400.00  
Total Tendered: \$400.00  
Change Amt: \$0.00

Case #3:16-CV-649



TIMOTHY P. BOSSON, ESQ.\*†  
ROBERT G. ROSE, ESQ.\*^  
\* LICENSED IN VA  
^ LICENSED IN NJ  
† RATED BY  
**Super Lawyers**



**CHRISTIAN**  
—LEGAL AID  
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

65 MASSACHUSETTS AVE NW  
WASHINGTON, DC 20001  
(PHYSICAL)

PO Box 70555  
WASHINGTON, DC 20024  
(MAILING)

August 1, 2016

*via overnight delivery*

Attn: Clerk's Office  
Spottswood W. Robinson III &  
Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Federal Courthouse  
701 East Broad Street  
Richmond, VA 23219

**Re: Corey A. Howell v. A.M. Moore, et al.  
U.S. District Court for E.D. Va., Richmond Division**

To Whom It May Concern:

Please find enclosed for filing a civil Complaint for the above-referenced matter. Also enclosed are a Civil Cover Sheet, three (3)<sup>1</sup> duplicate copies of the Complaint, and a \$400 check for your filing and administrative fees. Please note that we plan to attempt a waiver of service of summons.

Thank you for your attention in this regard. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions or concerns. With kind regards, I remain

Very truly yours,

Timothy P. Bosson, Esq.

Enclosures

Cc: Corey A. Howell  
Monique Miles

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<sup>1</sup> We were advised not to provide an additional copy of the Complaint for the five John Doe defendants.